学术报告 REPORT
    2018年6月1日—2018年6月2日
    地点:北京清华大学
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    明尼苏达大学副教授崔海涛:产能分配博弈中的认识层级

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    崔海涛

    明尼苏达大学副教授

    【主讲】明尼苏达大学副教授崔海涛

    【题目】产能分配博弈中的认识层级

    【时间】2013-12-13(周五),10.00-12:00

    【地点】清华经管学院伟伦楼453

    【语言】英语

    【主办】管理科学与工程系

    【摘要】We consider a supply chain with a single supplier and multiple retailers, in which the retailers make orders to the supplier. If the retailers’ orders exceed the supplier’s capacity, a proportional rationing rule will apply in allocating capacity among retailers. We experimentally study the game, and the orders made by the subjects who are motivated by financial incentives are significantly different from the Nash equilibrium. In addition, the data also suggests heterogeneities among the subjects. We propose a behavioral model based on the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) theory, in which decision makers are cognitively heterogeneous. The theoretical model reveals three interesting results. First, the retailer’s order quantity is significantly below the Nash equilibrium. Secondly, the average order quantity increases as the number of retailers goes down or as the supplier’s production capacity becomes smaller. Lastly, and most interestingly, a retailer’s profit first increases in his level of thinking until this level reaches a certain point, and then decreases afterwards. This inverted U relationship suggests that a retailer could improve his profit by taking some iterations of thinking, and yet over analyzing the situation can be self-defeating. We structurally estimate the model parameters using the maximum-likelihood method, and the results confirm the predictions of the behavioral model.