时间：12月28日上午10：30AM
地点：伟伦南431
题目: Push or Pull? Auctioning Supply Contracts
演讲人：
Prof. CuiHong Li
School of Business, University of Connecticut
摘要:
Consider a buyer that sources from multiple potential suppliers via a competitive bidding process. The suppliers have heterogeneous production costs, which are private information. The buyer faces uncertain demand of the product, and the winning supplier has to invest in the capacity before this uncertainty is
resolved. Push and pull contracts are two simple and normative price-only contracts that impose contrasting risk allocation between the buyer and supplier. We analyze and compare the performances of procurement
auctions for push and pull contracts. We first examine the situation where the wholesale price of a contract is fully determined by competitive bidding, then extend the analysis to the situation where post-auction price adjustment is allowed that enhances the profits of both parties.
We study how the selection between the push and pull contracts in procurment auctions is influenced by the supply market characteristics and product characteristics. We find that a larger supplier pool size and a higher revenue lead to a favorable consideration of the push mechanism, while a greater supplier cost level and lower capacity cost benefit the pull mechanism. With the post-auction price adjustment, the pull mechanism is also preferred if the relative variability of the market demand is high.
In the procurment auction for a push or pull contract there exist both information asymmetry and double marginalization, while the Stackelberg negotiation for a push or pull contract, which is extensively studied in the literature, is under complete information with double marginalization only. We compare the supply chain efficiency in these two situations, and show that information asymmetry mitigates double marginalization and leads to higher supply chain efficiency.
