| Peijun Guo
日本横滨国立大学教授
|
|
【主讲】Peijun Guo，日本横滨国立大学教授
【主题】专注于选择理论及其在解决圣彼得堡、阿莱和埃尔斯伯格悖论和其他异常现象中的应用
【时间】2019年3月22日（周五）上午10:00
Dr. Peijun Guo is Professor of Decision Sciences, Faculty of Business Administration, Yokohama National University, Japan. He received the BE, ME and PhD in 1990, 1993 and 1996, respectively, all from Dalian University of Technology and the PhD in 2000 from Osaka Prefecture University majoring in industrial engineering.
He was an Assistant Professor (2000–2001), an Associate Professor (2001–2007) in Faculty of Economics, Kagawa University, an Associate Professor (2007-2012) and Professor (2012- ) in Faculty of Business Administration, Yokohama National University.
His research interests involve operation research and management science, mainly in decision analysis under uncertainty and uncertainty modeling. He proposes focus theory of choice and one-shot decision theory. His papers also appear in European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on SMC, Part A: Systems and Humans, Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, Information Sciences, Fuzzy Sets and Systems etc.
Prof. Guo is an Associate Editor of Information Sciences, an Associate Editor of IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems and the Editorial Board Members of several International Journals.
【Speaker】Peijun Guo，Professor of Decision Sciences, Faculty of Business Administration, Yokohama National University, Japan.
【Topic】Focus Theory of Choice and Its Application to Resolving the St. Petersburg, Allais, and Ellsberg Paradoxes and Other Anomalies
【Time】Friday, Mar 22, 2019, 10:00
【Venue】Room 453, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM
【Organizer】Department of Management Science and Engineering
【Abstract】We present a decision theory which models and axiomatizes a decision-making procedure (called the procedural rationality). This procedure involves two steps: in the first step, for each action, some specific event which can bring about a relatively high outcome with a relatively high probability or a relatively low outcome with a relatively high probability is selected as the positive or negative focus, respectively; in the second step, based on the foci of all actions, a decision maker chooses a most-preferred action. The proposed axioms are supported by psychological evidences. Our model handles decision making with risk or under ambiguity or under ignorance within a unified framework and can account for many anomalies, including preference reversals, violations of stochastic dominance, violations of transitivity, the St. Petersburg, Allais, and Ellsberg paradoxes, the event-splitting effect, and the violation of tail-separability.
|
