| Mu Xia
Assistant Professor of Information Systems College of Commerce and Business Administration University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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【主题】Combinatorial Auctions
【时间】2002-06-05, 下午04:30-05:30
【地点】清华经管学院 北207
【语言】中文/英文
【内容摘要】
Single-item auctions have many desirable properties. Mechanisms exist to ensure optimality, incentive compatibility and market clearing prices. When multiple items are offered through individual auctions, a bidder wanting a bundle of items faces an exposure problem if the bidder places a high value on a combination of goods but a low value on strict subsets of the desired collection. To remedy this, combinatorial auctions permit bids on bundles of goods. However, combinatorial auctions are hard to optimize and may not have incentive compatible mechanisms or market clearing individual item prices. In this presentation, we compare single item-auctions and combinatorial auctions and present some results pricing combinatorial auctions. |
