| 冯娟
"PhD candidate in Management Science & Information Systems with Operations Research Dual Title Penn State University"
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【主题】One Auction or Two: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Sales in Multi-unit Auctions 【时间】2003-3-20 上午10:00
【地点】清华经管学院 北207【语言】中文/英文
【内容摘要】
Multi-unit, sequential auctions are becoming more and more important in practice as a way of allocating resources. While most standard results suggest that the auctioneer will get the same revenue from selling his items through sequential auctions as through a single auction, why are sequential auctions still observed? We analyze the case where both the auctioneer and the bidders are impatient, and find that whether or not to use sequential auctions largely depends on the intensity of market competition.
We also explore the problem of whether or not the auctioneer should tell bidders how many items are available for the auction. We use backward induction to derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies for both bidders and auctioneer. We find that it is valuable for the auctioneer with a large number of items to create uncertainty about the number of periods, that is not to reveal the information about numbers of items for sale.
The optimal auction in our setting is known; it introduces a reserve price to which the seller is committed not to sell below it. We discuss the case when the auctioneer cannot commit, and find that the effect of the reserve price to raise revenue is reduced, and under some conditions the auction with reserve price generates less expected revenue than the sequential auction discussed above. |
