| Jingqi Wang
香港大学助理教授
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【主讲】香港大学助理教授Jingqi Wang
【时间】2014年12月30日（周二）10.00-12.00
【摘要】We study a supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier who invests in innovation, which increases the value of products to users, and downstream manufacturers who sell to users. Analyzing a bargaining model, we find that the supplier’s optimal innovation level is higher under downstream competition than under a downstream monopoly if the supplier does not have a strong bargaining power. If the supplier already has a strong bargaining power, the supplier should make more innovation investment only if the downstream competition is relatively mild. Interestingly, we find that if the supplier has a strong bargaining power, an intense competition between downstream manufacturers negatively impacts the supplier’s profit. Finally, we show that a stronger bargaining power may not always benefit manufacturers.
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