| CHEN Shi
Assistant Professor, Washington University in Seattle
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【主讲】华盛顿大学（西雅图）助理教授陈实
【时间】2014年9月16日（周二）10.30-12.00
【摘要】We consider a project supply chain, in which a sequence of tasks are involved and each task requires the use of certain key materials. We focus on structuring the optimal time-based incentive contract under which channel coordination can be achieved for such supply chains. In addition to a pre-specified penalty/bonus term, the optimal contract requires optimizing the material delivery schedule, as well as the amount and timing of the payment to each supplier. Under this contract, the supplier benefits from a reduction in the mean duration of the delivery lead time, while the manufacturer does so only if she has a stronger financial position in the supply chain. We also show that channel coordination can be achieved even if the manufacturer's estimate of the average delivery lead time is biased, and what is more, the supplier will not be incentivized to conceal his true estimate, which implies that the prevalent issue of lack of information transparency in project supply chains can be mitigated by using the proposed contract.
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