【主讲】Luyi Yang，约翰霍普金斯大学凯里商学院助理教授
【主题】一种Queue-Scalping模型
【时间】2020年4月22日（周三）上午 9:00am
【地点】线上：zoom软件，会议ID: 477 088 5214
【语言】英文
【主办】管理科学与工程系
【简历】Luyi Yang教授简历
Luyi Yang is an assistant professor of operations management and business analytics at Johns Hopkins University, Carey Business School. His research interests span service operations, business model innovation, digital marketplace, sharing economy, sustainable operations and operations-marketing interface. He has a keen interest in understanding emerging business phenomena and policy issues that involve strategic (social) interactions and novel system dynamics, often driven by new technologies. His work has been published in leading journals such as Management Science and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, covered by major media outlets such as Forbes, and recognized by various research awards. Prior to joining Carey, Professor Yang received his Ph.D. and M.B.A. from the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, and his B.S. in Industrial Engineering and B.A. in English, both from Tsinghua University. He will be joining the faculty of the University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business this summer.
【Speaker】Luyi Yang, Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins University, Carey Business School.
【Topic】A Model of Queue-Scalping
【Time】Wednesday, April 22, 2020, 9:00am
【Venue】Online: zoom, Meeting ID: 477 088 5214
【Language】English
【Organizer】Department of Management Science and Engineering
【Abstract】
Recent years have witnessed the rise of queue-scalping in congestion-prone service systems, including major hospitals and call centers. A queue-scalper has no material interest in the primary service but proactively enters the queue in hopes of selling his spot later. This paper develops a queueing-game-theoretic model of queue-scalping and examines its implications for the service system. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which suggests that scalping, borne out of capacity scarcity, should be most rampant in a queue where the demand volume far exceeds capacity, we find instead that a queue with an intermediate demand volume can be most susceptible to scalping, whereas queues with either a very small or a very large demand volume may not be financially attractive to scalpers and thus impervious to scalping. This result implies that an effort to mitigate scalping through capacity expansion may only lead to the presence of more scalpers. Further, when queue-scalpers are present, they often increase the system throughput, the service provider’s revenue and social welfare, but decrease consumer surplus. This implies that the presence of scalping can not only benefit the service provider but also shield it from public outrage as customers would blame the scalpers for extracting their surplus, rather than the service provider. We also compare and contrast queue-scalping with other common mechanisms in practice, namely, pay-for-priority, line-sitting, and callbacks.
